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We show that workers displaced from their stable jobs during mass-layoffs in 1982 recession in 
Germany suffered permanent earnings losses of 10-15% lasting at least 15 years. These estimates 
are obtained using data and methodology comparable to similar studies for the United States. 
Exploiting advantages of the German data, we also show that while reduction and recovery in 
time worked plays a role in explaining earnings losses during the first ten years, the majority of 
the long-run loss is due to a decline in wages. We also show that even the generous German 
unemployment insurance system replaced only a small fraction of the total earnings loss. These 
findings suggest that job displacements can lead to large and lasting reductions in income even in 
labor markets with tighter social safety nets and lower earnings inequality. 
 
                                                 
1 We thank the DFG for supporting this paper as part of the research project “Discrepancies between Market and 
Firm Wages: An Analysis of Earnings and Worker Mobility” within the DFG research program “Flexibility in 
Heterogenous Labor Markets" (SSP 1169). All errors are our own. 
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1. Introduction 
Mounting evidence from the United States suggests that the cost of recessions is highly 
unequally distributed across the labor force. In particular, several papers suggest that workers 
displaced during the 1982 recession suffered large losses in annual earnings lasting over 15 years 
(Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan 1993, von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009). With 
displacement rates reaching ten to fifteen percent of employment in large recessions, this implies 
that a substantial fraction of workers suffers large permanent reductions in their life-time 
earnings. In comparison, the decline of total earnings of workers who remain employed is 
relatively small. 
It is an important question whether this is a phenomenon mostly relevant in the United 
States. Is it the case that displaced workers in European countries with lower earnings inequality, 
more generous social safety nets, and more managed labor market transitions fare better in 
recessions? Yet, despite the importance of the question, there is little evidence on the long-term 
effect of layoffs during the recession of the early 1980s in Europe that is comparable with U.S. 
studies.2 While a longstanding literature suggests European labor markets may have responded 
differently to the recession in the early 1980s because of their labor market institutions, the focus 
of that literature has been mainly on the macro-economic evolution of unemployment and wages. 
On the other hand, there is no direct evidence from the U.S. on the effect of institutions such as 
unemployment insurance on the long-term income losses of displaced workers. 
In this paper we study the long-term effect of job displacement in Germany using an 
exceptional data source with longitudinal information on workers and their employers covering 
30 years. This rich data source allows us to closely replicate existing U.S. studies on the long-
term effect of job displacement during the early 1980s recession on annual earnings. As a result, 
we obtain state-of-the-art estimates of the effect of displacement during recessions for Germany 
that are also comparable to similar studies from the United States. In addition, two key 
advantages of the German data over comparable data sources from the U.S. allow us to further 
improve our understanding of the effects of job displacement. First, we exploit direct measures 
of days worked to examine the role of reductions in employment and wages in explaining long-
                                                 
2 While by now there are several European studies analyzing job displacement, they either do not focus on the long-
term effect from displacement in recessions, or they are hard to compare to U.S. studies or amongst each other 
because of differences in methodology or data limitations. For a brief overview of studies of job displacement in the 
United States and the EU see von Wachter (2009). 
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term earnings losses. Second, we can directly study whether unemployment insurance payments 
help to significantly buffer the effect of job displacement on workers disposable income. Neither 
aspect has been studied to this extent before because of a lack of appropriate data. 
 As comparable studies in the U.S., we find that workers in stable jobs separating from 
their main employer in the course of a mass-layoff in the early 1980s suffer reductions in annual 
earnings of 10-15% lasting at least 15 years. This suggests that job displacement has highly 
detrimental effects on earnings even in a labor market with a tighter safety net and lower 
earnings inequality. Exploiting features unique to the German data we also find that although 
temporary reductions in time worked explain part of the reductions in earnings, the majority of 
the long-term effect is driven by a lasting decline in daily wages. This suggests that some of the 
loss and recovery in earnings in the U.S. may be driven by reductions in time worked, 
information not readily available in the administrative data there. This is despite the fact that 
unemployment insurance is more generous in Germany and therefore non-employment durations 
likely longer after job loss so that we would expect the role of employment to be even smaller in 
the United States. 
 Finally, we show that payments from the generous German unemployment insurance 
system only replace a small fraction of displaced workers’ lost earnings. This evidence, not 
available from similar U.S. data, suggests that unemployment insurance is unable to significantly 
smooth the large earnings losses associated with displacement. This effect is likely to be even 
smaller in the American labor market, where unemployment insurance is shorter lived and covers 
a smaller fraction of the unemployed. Thus, it appears that independent of the institutional 
environment of the labor market, job displacement leads to large and lasting declines in affected 
workers’ disposable income. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of our 
definitions of job displacement and describes the data. There, we also provide basic descriptive 
estimates of the effect of job displacement on earnings, wages, and time worked. Section 3 
presents results from a regression-based comparison of displaced workers’ earnings with the 
evolution of earnings of a control group of non-displaced workers. We also discuss the role of 
unemployment insurance receipt as a means to smooth long-term displacement-related earnings 
losses. Section 4 puts our study in relation to the existing literature, Section 5 presents 
preliminary conclusions. 
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2. Methodology and Basic Patterns 
2.1 Measuring Job Displacement at Mass-Layoffs 
The goal of our empirical approach is to remain as comparable as possible to state-of-the-
art studies from the U.S. literature, while exploiting advantages specific to the German data we 
use. In particular, availability of daily information on both earnings and unemployment insurance 
receipt will allow us to better date job separations and analyze time worked and other sources of 
income as additional outcomes. 
We analyze the short- and long-term effects of an unexpected involuntary loss of a stable 
job in difficult economic times. As in recent studies using administrative data from the U.S. (e.g., 
Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993, von Wachter, Song and Manchester 2009), we focus on 
involuntary job loss (henceforth, job displacement) occurring during the recession of the early 
1980s. The recession of the early 1980s recession is interesting because it is the last large 
recession in most Western economies, including Germany and the U.S., involving a large 
number of layoffs and high rates of unemployment. It is also a period during which many 
countries a paradigm shift in labor markets appears to have taken place, leading to persistent 
increases in unemployment in Germany and in earnings inequality in the U.S.. Finally, focusing 
on the early 1980s enables us to follow workers for a long period of time after job displacement.3 
 To study the long-term effects of job displacement during the early 1980s, we exploit a 
large administrative data base containing longitudinal information on workers and firms since 
1975. This data base has high-quality information on earnings, employment transitions, and firm 
characteristics. However, as for comparable data sources in the U.S. and other countries, there is 
no direct information regarding the reason of a job separation. 
We follow the existing U.S. literature and define a job displacement as the event that a 
high-tenured worker leaves his main employer in the course of a mass-layoff event. The analysis 
of workers leaving stable jobs has several advantages. It focuses on workers who in all likelihood 
expected to remain in their job in the absence of a mass-layoff, and thus were likely to be 
surprised by being displaced. Moreover, given the steep reduction in job mobility with even a 
few years of job tenure in Germany, very few of these workers were likely to have moved 
voluntarily. This reduces the potential measurement error in the definition of job displacement. 
                                                 
3 Since in most countries large-scale administrative data bases were instituted in the mid- to late-1970s studying the 
long-term effect of layoffs before the early 1980s is difficult.  
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We work with two definitions of a mass-layoff event. First, we define a mass-layoff to 
occur either when the firm’s employment permanently declines by thirty or more percent over a 
short period of time. Second, we also consider the case when firms permanently close.4 To make 
these definitions meaningful, we consider only workers whose employers had at least 50 
employees  in the year prior to the employment drop and did not have large employment 
fluctuations in the years before.. This definition allows us to replicate findings in the U.S. 
literature. Smaller firms are subject to larger percentage fluctuations, such that these measures of 
mass-layoff are less meaningful.5 
A key step in measuring mass-layoff events is to distinguish between actual permanent 
reductions in firms’ employment and events such as mergers, takeovers, outsourcing, or changes 
in firm identification numbers. Since such events occur frequently in administrative data, we 
have constructed a complete cross-flow matrix of worker flows between establishments. Using 
this flow matrix, we only consider a reduction an employment a mass-layoff event, if the 
majority of laid-off workers is dispersed among new employer (i.e., if there is no large flow of 
workers to a different establishment). This is a common methodology used, say, by the U.S. 
Census to adjust longitudinal firm-level employment information.6 Not adjusting our mass-layoff 
data in this way would imply potentially serious measurement-error, likely biasing our results 
towards finding no effect of displacement on earnings. 
By focusing on job separations of high-tenured workers during mass-layoffs at medium-
sized to large employers we obtain a very clean measure of job displacement that is comparable 
with the existing literature. A common criticism is that this may focus on workers that are more 
likely to have larger earnings losses at displacement. Von Wachter et al. (2009) and Hildreth et 
al. (2009) have shown that this is not the case for the restriction on higher-tenured workers. 
However, it is well known that larger firms pay more, and loss in a wage premium associated 
with firm size may be one explanation of the larger earnings losses we find (von Wachter and 
Bender 2006).  
                                                 
4 We have experimented with other definitions of mass-layoffs. See Hildreth, von Wachter, and Weber (2009) for 
additional robustness analysis and discussion. 
5 Our method of identifying mass-layoffs is described in detail in the appendix. 
6 The data we use contains only information on establishments; however, we will use the terms firms and 
establishment interchangeably even though we cannot merge units from multi-establishments firms. 
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2.2 German Administrative Data 
 The data consist of the all workers that were ever employed at a firm experiencing a 
mass-layoff event as just described occurring from 1981-1985. This data has been combined with 
a large random sample of workers that were not present during a mass-layoff in that period. For 
these workers, we have complete information on career histories running from 1975 to 2005 
from the Employment History File (Beschäftigtenstatistik) of the IAB. This data consists of 
complete day-to-day information on earnings and time worked in each employment spell 
occurring in employment covered by social security.7 The data also contains basic demographic 
characteristics including education, as well as information on occupation and industry. This data 
has been complemented with information on receipt of unemployment (from the 
Leistungsempfängerdatei). In addition, the worker-level data has been merged with information 
on employers (obtained from the Betriebshistorikdatei). 
 From this data, the main outcomes we consider in this study are total annual earnings, 
total annual income (consisting of earnings plus payments form unemployment insurance), the 
daily wage at a given calendar date, and days worked or in unemployment per year. All earnings, 
income, and wage measures have been deflated using the Consumer Price Index and thus 
represent Euros in 2000 prices. Our main outcome variable, total annual earnings, is comparable 
to similar measures available in administrative U.S. data.8 Detailed information on 
unemployment insurance and days worked is typically not available in comparable U.S. data 
sources. 
 Following the existing literature, we make a few additional restrictions. Most notably, we 
drop workers younger than age 25, since they may not have fully entered the labor force. We 
also drop workers older than age 53, who had access to partial retirement programs in Germany 
during that period. We also only use information on individuals that work in covered 
employment or receive unemployment benefits for at least one day in a given year, since 
otherwise we have little information on individuals’ activities. This is likely to understate our 
wage losses, since some workers may exit the labor force for more than a year in response to 
                                                 
7 Roughly 80% of the labor force is covered by social security; the remainder consists of students, self-employed, 
and government employees. 
8 In contrast to earnings data used in U.S. studies, the German data is top-coded. However, there is no reason why 
the presence of the top-code should affect displaced workers more than non-displaced workers; in fact, we suspect it 
would be vice versa, leading us to understate the earnings losses at job displacement. 
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earnings losses. Here, we depart from von Wachter et al. (2009), whose study of U.S. earnings 
losses includes zero earnings even if an individual drops out of the labor force for multiple years. 
Our main sample thus consists of workers displaced in middle age. This is shown in 
Table 1, which displays basic sample characteristics for workers separating and not separating 
from their employer.9  In the year prior to separation, it is apparent that job separators are 
slightly younger and slightly lower job tenure. Correspondingly, as found by others, separators 
have somewhat lower baseline annual earnings. However, there is no difference in the number of 
days worked or days spent in unemployment among the two groups.  
                                                
The small initial differences increase markedly after separation. The difference in 
earnings among separators and non-separators increases from about 10% to 30% in 1982, the 
year of separation. This difference remains high in 1983, the year after job separation, but 
declines to about 13% in 1990, eight years after separation. As we will see in the next section, 
little further recovery occurs afterwards. If we only consider earnings for workers employed (i.e., 
excluding zero earnings), the discrepancy is smaller, especially in around separation. Initial 
earnings losses appear partly driven by reductions in employment. However, it is important to 
note that differences in age or education remain roughly stable, such that there is no strong 
indication that the least skilled job separators systematically drop out of the labor force.   
2.3 Descriptive Analysis 
Given the longitudinal data at our disposition, we can follow the outcomes of displaced 
workers and their non-displaced counterparts before and after the layoff event. For our main 
outcome, annual earnings, this is shown in Figure 2. The Figure shows the evolution of earnings 
for workers displaced during a mass-layoff of 30% and those not displaced in 1982, the through 
of the early 1980s recession. Note that to be comparable with similar estimates for the U.S. labor 
market in von Wachter et al. (2009), this includes zero earnings. Below, we will address the role 
of zero earnings and unemployment receipt explicitly.  
The figure contains three core messages. First, displacement leads to a large initial drop 
in annual earnings of 8000 to 9000 Euros. This constitutes a decline of 25-30% relative to 
baseline average earnings of displaced workers. Second, while earnings recover, this recovery is 
parallel to earnings growth occurring for the control group of non-displaced workers as well. 
Thus, while displaced workers’ earnings recover to the level of their own earnings prior to 
 
9 The differences among displaced and non-displaced workers are very similar. 
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displacement within five to ten years, even twenty years after job displacement a large gap in 
earnings relative to the control group remains. Third, there is an initial difference in average 
earnings between displaced and non-displaced workers, which we will address in our regression 
analysis below. However, there do not appear to be substantial differences in prior earnings 
trends, something which will become important below. 
These results are comparable to the long-term effect of displacement in the U.S., which 
also show a substantial and very persistent decline in earnings for workers displaced in the 
recession of the early 1980s. As in the U.S., displaced workers in Germany can be subject to 
very long lasting earnings penalties. This finding is very robust to the definition of mass-layoff 
event, and also holds if we widen our displacement period from 1980-1985.  
These earnings losses are not only due to reduction in days worked. In fact, the long-run 
decline in earnings is almost entirely driven by a reduction in the average daily wage. However, 
part of the large initial drop in total annual earnings and the ensuing increase appear to be driven 
by a reduction and recovery in the total number of days worked. These patterns are shown in 
Figure 3. Figure 3A shows daily wages measured on June 30th of each year for the displaced 
sample of workers and the control group. As for annual earnings wages the trends in wages up to 
one year before displacement are very similar in shape although the level is lower among the 
displaced workers. After job loss, the workers in the displaced sample experience a lasting  
decline in wages. However while earnings begin to rebound in the second year, wages for the 
displaced workers continue to diverge in year 2 and 3 after displacement. This may indicate that 
the workers who are the first to be employed again have relatively smaller wage drops.  
A key question is whether the decline in annual earnings shown in Figure 2 also leads to 
corresponding decline in disposable income. This is an important question because in most 
countries unemployment insurance is meant to provide significant income transfers to displaced 
workers. However, in the U.S., this is very difficult to answer because information on receipt of 
unemployment insurance is often not merged to administrative data on earnings. Figure 4A 
shows the number of days workers in our sample receive unemployment insurance 
(Arbeitslosengeld (ALG) or Arbeitslosenhilfe (ALH)).10 Figure 4B shows the amount received 
                                                 
10 During the early 1980s a worker is eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits (Arbeitslosengeld ALG) 
after having worked for at least 12 months in the previous 3 years. Potential ALG durations depend on work 
experience but in our sample of high tenure workers everyone is eligible for the maximum of 12 months of ALG 
(after 1984 this maximum duration was increased for older workers).  ALG offers replacement rates of 68 percent on 
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in Euros. According to bother measures, it appears that displaced workers receive a significant 
amount of unemployment insurance in the first years after job loss. Unemployment insurance 
receipt remains higher up to eight years after displacement. However, while this constitutes an 
important transfer, it is apparent that this does not buffer the long-term effect of displacement on 
income. Moreover, as will be apparent below, total transfers from the unemployment insurance 
system on average cover only a small portion of lost earnings. As a result, the total loss in annual 
earnings closely approximates the total loss in personal income. 
3. Earnings Losses Relative to Control Group 
3.1 Methodology 
As documented in Table 1 and apparent from Figures 1 and 2, systematic differences in 
average earnings and age exist between workers who separate from their long-term employment 
in the early 1980s and workers who keep their jobs. It is also apparent that strong cyclical swings 
and trends in earnings may confound the effects of job loss. To get a complete picture of the 
long-term earnings losses of job separators, we need to make a comparison to a control group but 
at the same time explicitly account for possible systematic differences among workers in a 
regression framework.  




itkittiit uDXy ++++= ∑
−≥ ,
δβγα  (1) 
where the outcome variable yit  represents a measure of annual earnings, the year dummies γt  
are identified by the presence of workers not separating from their job (the control group), and 
the error uit  represents truly random components affecting the outcome. The coefficients δ k  on 
the dummies indicating the k-th period before, during, or after job separation ( Dit
k
) measure the 
time path of earnings changes of job separators before and after a displacement relative to the 
baseline and the control group. The ability to estimate the dynamic effect of job separation is of 
particular interest since it will allow us to obtain summary measures of the overall lifetime cost 
of job separation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the last gross wage. After the 12 month period workers may qualify for means tested unemployment assistance 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe ALH) which has no maximum duration and provides a replacement rate of 58 percent on the 
previous gross wage, however other income (such as capital or spousal income is deducted). For more information 
on the German UI system see Hunt (1995). 
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The displacement effect is identified by the inclusion of workers staying at their 
employers throughout the period under study (the control group). To interpret the estimated 
effects δ k  as the causal impact of job separation on earnings, however, we have to assume that 
conditional on worker fixed effects and included observable baseline characteristics, displaced 
workers are observationally equal to those workers in the control group. This is the strategy 
chosen by most classic studies of the effect of job loss (e.g., Ruhm 1990, Jacobson, Lalonde, and 
Sullivan 1993). If workers are on average remunerated according to their productivity, then the 
long-run average of earnings should be a good index of their overall earnings potential. In this 
case, comparing a job separator and a non-separator with similar worker fixed effects yields a 
valid estimate of the effect of job loss.  
Given the large change in earnings for job separators, this approach is most persuasive in the 
presence of a long window of observation prior to the job separation. Similarly, it is most 
appropriate for mature workers whose earnings represent their productivity. For example, in the 
case of younger workers, wages often do not yet reflect their long-term earnings potential and 
fixed effect strategies are not viable (e.g., von Wachter and Bender 2006). Since our observation 
window covers a long time period prior to job separation and the average age of workers in our 
sample is close to 40, we believe our fixed effect estimation strategy will uncover estimates that 
yield good first approximations of the causal effect of job separations on earnings. 
A potential concern with estimates obtained from the model in equation (1) is that they 
do not allow for differential trends among displaced workers and workers in the control group. 
As a result, we may attribute negative trends in earnings in industries experiencing high rates of 
layoff to the event of job displacement itself. In both cases, our approach would lead us to 
overestimate the effect of displacement. Similarly, it might be that firms chose to layoff workers 
with lower average earnings growth, or that firms suffering mass-layoff had lower average 
growth rates. Using different strategies Jacobson et al. (1993) and Von Wachter et al. (2009) 
address these potential threats to internal validity, and find that the main strategy in equation (1) 
gives a good estimate of the long-term effect of job displacements.11 To some degree, this is 
apparent from the pattern shown in Figures 2 to 4, which do show significant differences in pre-
                                                 
11 Including worker-specific linear trends, Jacobson et al. (1993) find that the model in equation (1) underestimates 
the effect of displacement on earnings; allowing for differential flexible yearly trends for 2-digit industry and prior 
average earnings, von Wachter et al. (2009) find that the model slightly overestimates the effect. 
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displacement earnings trends. Instead, there seems to be a sudden sharp earnings decline at the 
time of layoff. 
3.2 Main Findings 
The results of the regression analysis for the difference in annual earnings of displaced 
workers relative to the baseline period compared to the regular evolution of earnings of the 
control group are shown in Figure 5. The figure clearly demonstrates the basic patterns already 
noted in the descriptive analysis. The figure displays a slight decline in annual earnings prior to 
the layoff year (denoted as zero). There is a large drop in earnings at displacement. Earnings 
bounce back, an effect partly due to a recovery in the number of days worked (see below). 
Earnings continue to recover for another few years. However, starting at five years after 
displacement, the recovery rate slows. A week recovery continues until ten years after 
displacement, after which the earnings loss settles at a level of about 3500 Euro, a long term loss 
relative to pre-displacement earnings of about 12%. This pattern is very similar if we consider 
establishment closures instead of a permanent decline in establishment employment. 
As noted above, these patterns are quite similar to what has been found in the United 
States. Clearly, the exact long-term percentage loss differs slightly, and appears somewhat higher 
in the U.S. (von Wachter et al (2009) find long-term losses of about 15-20% with a similar 
methodology. The pattern in the German data show a weaker decline in earnings prior to job 
loss, a steeper drop at displacement, and smoother recovery. This is likely to be due to our larger 
samples and the better dating of job separations using daily data. We should stress that the 
findings in Figure 5 are robust to alternative definitions of mass-layoff or different sample 
restrictions. 
A key question is whether the declines in annual earnings are due to reductions in daily 
wages or in days worked. In the U.S., the majority of the long-term effect appears to be due to a 
decline in wages, but the direct evidence on time worked is scant. In Germany on the other hand, 
it is often suspected that lasting reductions in employment play an important role. We also 
replicated the regression analysis for the daily wage, shown in Figure 6. The decline in daily 
wages is permanent and large – relative to initial average earnings of 80 Euros for displaced 
workers the long-term drop is about 10%, with little signs of recovery.  
The recovery in total annual earnings we find in Figure 5 appears thus mainly driven by 
recovery in days worked. As Figure 3 suggests, recovery in time worked matters mostly in the 
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first 10 years after displacement, with the majority of the development concentrated in the first 
five years. This is an important finding for two reasons. On the one hand, it implies that even in 
Germany the long-run earnings loss is to an important extent driven by reductions in wages. On 
the other hand, it complements studies for the U.S. without information on days worked. The 
result suggests that part of the initial recovery in the U.S. is also likely to be due to changes in 
time worked, though the magnitude is likely to be lower due to less generous unemployment 
insurance benefits. In fact, Figure 4 had shown that an important part of the variation in time 
worked is due to increases in days spent in unemployment insurance. 
A related question is how important unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are in 
smoothing the decline in earnings. Since UI benefits in Germany are on average longer than the 
U.S., this should yield an upper bound on the potential effect of UI in helping to smooth income 
for displaced workers. This question is addressed in Figure 7, which displays average annual 
income, defined as the sum of earnings and UI benefits. As a comparison, the figure also shows 
the evolution of total annual earnings. Not surprisingly, it appears that UI benefits make the 
biggest difference in the first few years after a job loss. However, a large fraction of earnings 
losses do not appear to be buffered by UI, partly because not all displaced workers receive UI 
and partly because replacement rates are well below unity. This is an important finding, since 
although ALG is of limited duration, the typical duration of ALH is much longer. Thus, even 
though Germany has very generous UI benefits relative to the U.S., these benefits cannot prevent 
large declines in income.12 We also replicated the figure excluding zero values for earnings and 
income (not shown). It appears that excluding zeros does not make a large difference, suggesting 
that we are unlikely to underestimate displaced workers’ income from other sources (such as 
disability benefits or welfare). 
Overall, independent of the institutional environment, displaced workers suffer long-term 
earnings and wage losses lasting 15 years, without signs of significant recovery. The magnitude 
of these earnings losses is substantial, and on the order of 10-15% in Germany, and 15-20% in 
                                                 
12 There are several potential explanations for the small impact of unemployment insurance benefits on average; 
first, only a minority of displaced workers becomes unemployed; of those unemployed, not all file for 
unemployment insurance; of those who file, the typical duration of benefit receipt is quite short; for those receiving 
benefits, replacement rates are about 60%. The findings here are consistent with results from North America 
suggesting that unemployment insurance only partly insulates workers against consumption declines during 
unemployment spells (e.g., Gruber 1997). An important qualification is that we refer only to the role of 
unemployment insurance benefits in providing short term transfer income; it could still be that more generous 
unemployment insurance allows workers to find better job matches.  
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the United States. The losses result partly from reductions in employment. But especially over 
the long run, they arise due to a large extent from lasting declines in the wage.  
The similarity in the patterns for Germany with those of the U.S. is not surprising, since 
similar mechanisms are likely to be at play. On the one hand, displaced workers are believed to 
lose skills associated with their prior industry or occupation. On the other hand, firm or industry 
specific wage premiums may be lost at displacement. Both phenomena have been found to be 
relevant in Germany and the United States labor market, although possibly with different degree 
of importance. 
4. Relation to Prior Literature 
A number of previous studies have explored the earnings and employment histories of 
displaced workers in Germany. A common theme in these studies is that they find earnings 
losses that are at the lower end of estimates for the US and in particular are much lower than the 
wage and earnings losses that we find in this paper. For example Couch (2001) finds that 
workers' earnings two years after displacement are around 6.5 percent lower relative to previous 
earnings. Burda and Mertens (2001) report long run wage losses of 2 to 3 percent. Bender et. al. 
(2002) find wages to be around 1-2 percent lower after displacement, but workers that are not 
observed in employment in the year after displacement face an additional wage loss of 19 
percent.13 Here we briefly discuss the main differences of these studies that likely explain the 
differences in the findings. 
  A striking difference is that all three studies analyze job loss during the late 1980s (Burda 
and Mertens 2001 and Bender et. al. 2002) and early 1990s (Couch 2001), a period of strong 
economic growth and declining unemployment rates, while in this paper we analyze workers 
who were displaced in the recession year 1982.14 This different macro environment is likely the 
most important reason for the fact that we find much larger earnings losses.15 
Apart from different time periods, the other studies also differ with respect to the datasets 
used, the definition of displacement, the sample of workers and the definitions of dependent 
                                                 
13 An exception to this group is a recent paper by von Wachter and Bender (2008), who report that job separations in 
car manufacturing leading to a spell of unemployment of at least 30 days carry a long-term penalty of 5-10 years; 
this penalty is much larger for workers with medium or higher pre-displacement wages. 
14 Unemployment rates in West Germany fell from 9.1 to 6.4 percent from 1985 to 1992 and only started rising 
again during the 1993 recession. On the other hand over the interval 1981 to 1983 the unemployment rate rose from 
5.5 to 9.1 percent. 
15 We replicated our analysis for workers displaced in 1990 and found earnings losses of much smaller magnitude. 
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variables. Couch (2001) uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The 
displacement definition is based on workers indicating that they lost a job because the company 
closed down or were laid off. Burda and Mertens (2001) use the GSOEP to impute which 
separations in the IAB social security data can be considered displacements.16 Finally Bender et. 
al. (2002) use similar data as we do: the IAB social security data merged with establishment 
level information. They define workers as displaced if they leave an establishment just before it 
closes or during a more than 40 percent reduction in employment.17 While there are many small 
differences in sample restrictions and definitions across these studies and our own, two 
differences seem crucial: First, while these studies have no restrictions on establishment or firm 
size, due to our displacement definition, our study only investigates workers who lose their job in 
relatively large and stable establishments (with at least 50 employees in the previous year and 
only small changes in employment before that). Furthermore our main estimates are for workers 
who have been continuously employed at the same establishment for 5 years. Our sample thus 
consists of highly attached workers in large establishment who are likely from the upper part of 
the earnings distribution, which is consistent with the observation in Burda and Mertens (2001) 
that wage losses are much higher for the top half of the earnings distribution. Secondly we define 
workers as displaced if they permanently separate from an employer. Burda and Mertens (2001) 
show that nearly 50 percent of all unemployed workers return to their previous employer and that 
for these workers wage losses are very close to zero. By excluding such recalls we are also likely 
to get higher estimates of earnings and wage losses. 
Finally differences in specifications also make direct comparisons a little bit difficult. For 
example Bender et al (2002) report regression estimates that effectively split up earnings losses 
by workers who are re-employed within a year and workers who take more than 1 year to be 
employed again. For this last group they find large permanent wage losses of about 20 percent, 
while for the group that is re-employed relatively fast the earnings losses are very small. It seems 
                                                 
16 In their SOEP sample the imputation predicts layoffs with about 50 percent accuracy and they assume this 
accuracy also holds for their imputation in the IABS in order to scale the coefficients correctly. It seems at least 
possible that the out of sample prediction is less accurate, which would downward bias their results (since implicitly 
more voluntary quits are counted as displacements).  
17 Bender et al. (2002) did not have access to the Flow data that we used in this study to identify mass-layoffs and 
plant closings. In particular restructuring of firms, take-overs or establishment ID-changes may be classified falsely 
as large layoffs or plant closings. This leads to classifying workers who are continuously employed at the same 
workplace as displaced workers and thus likely down biases the estimated earnings losses. Hethey and Schmieder 
(2009) provide evidence that this misclassification problem is quite sizable, for example of all incidences of 
disappearing establishment IDs only about two third appear to be true plant closings. 
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plausible that the differences in displacement and sample definitions are most important for the 
group of workers that are employed quickly again and in particular that our sample has much 
fewer workers in this group and more workers that take more than a year to find employment 
again. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed the long-term consequences of job displacement in 
Germany during the early 1980s recession. Our empirical approach replicates that of recent 
similar studies in the United States, obtaining state-of-the art estimates of the impact of 
displacement that should be as comparable across countries as possible. We apply this 
methodology to a large longitudinal sample from German social security records spanning over 
30 years that is comparable to and in several ways superior to similar U.S. data sets. 
Our findings imply that separation from a stable job at a medium to large firm during a 
mass-layoff leads to persistent losses in annual earnings lasting at least 15 years. The long-term 
loss in earnings is about 10-15%, which matches similar estimates from the United States. These 
results are robust across several different specifications of displacement or mass-layoff. This 
implies that independently of the institutional environment in the labor market job displacement 
in a recession leads to substantial reductions in life time earnings for affected workers. 
The German data allows us to obtain two additional findings not usually available in 
common U.S. data sources. As in the U.S., the short-term loss in annual earnings we find is 
larger than the long-term loss. From our results it appears this is due largely to a reduction in 
time worked lasting for up to ten years after displacement. In contrast, we find that the decline in 
the daily wage (conditional on employment) is permanent without any recovery. Thus, on the 
one hand, it does not appear to be the case that a decline in time worked explains the majority of 
long-term earnings losses of displaced workers in Germany. On the other hand, the findings 
imply that some of the recovery in annual earnings in the U.S. during the first years after 
displacement is likely due to improvements in time worked. 
A second additional finding is that despite the long duration and relative generosity of 
German unemployment insurance (combining the two tiers, ALG and ALH), unemployment 
insurance benefits do not help to smooth a substantial fraction of the large earnings losses we 
find. Moreover, once we include information on unemployment insurance, we appear not to be 
missing many additional sources of income such as disability payments or social welfare. Thus, 
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our results imply that displacement leads to large losses in both earnings and total disposable 
income. Since this implies for Germany, this is likely also to be the case in the U.S., even though 
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In order to identify mass-layoffs and plant closings in the German administrative data we 
used the following approach. After merging the establishment history panel with information on 
all year to year cross establishment worker flows, we defined mass layoffs as a drop in 
employment from one year to the next of at least 30 percent in an establishment with at least 50 
employees in the year before the employment drop. To assure that these establishments were 
relatively stable prior to the drop and that the drop did not constitute just temporary fluctuations, 
we also required that employment did not increase by more than 30 percent in either of the two 
years before the employment drop and did not re-bounce in the two years after the drop. 
Furthermore to avoid identifying restructuring of the firm (such as outsourcing of larger parts) as 
a mass-layoff, we required that not more than 20 percent of the leaving workers were re-
employed together at a single establishment in the following year (thus the leaving workers are 
either unemployed or dispersed over many different establishments). Similarly we defined a 
plant-closing as a drop in employment of at least 80 percent, again requiring that not more than 
20 percent of the leaving workers were re-employed together in the following year.  
 
The establishment history panel and the flow data provide information on the workforce 
of the establishments on June 30th of each year. We thus consider a mass-layoff as happening in 
1982 if a plant loses 30 percent of its workforce between 1981 and 1982. We consider a worker 
as displaced in 1982 if he permanently left an establishment in 1982 and this establishment had a 
mass-layoff either in 1982 or 1983. 
 
In order to get precise estimates of how individual earnings histories are affected by 
mass-layoffs, we created a special random sample of work histories from the universe of the 
German security data (the Employment History File of the IAB complemented with information 
on unemployment insurance recipiency). The sampling design was such that in each year 40 
percent of all establishments that had a Mass-layoff in that year were randomly selected. In 
addition, in each year 0.4 percent of all establishments that did not have a mass-layoff in that 
year were selected. Since the sample is drawn for each year independently, an establishment that 
exists for several years without a MLF has a relatively high chance of entering the sample. We 
then extracted employment and unemployment histories for all workers who ever worked in any 
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of these establishments. These workers represent about 50 percent of the total social security data 
over this period. In order to be in our main analysis sample of workers displaced in 1982 and the 
control group, workers had to be continuously employed for at least 5 years at an establishment 
that was at risk of a mass-layoff in 1982 (according to our definition). Furthermore we only 
selected male workers age 25 to 52. 
 
Yearly earnings were calculated as the sum of all wages during that year measured Euro 
and deflated to prices of 2000. For these calculations we only used workers who in a given year 
had at least one observation (either because they were employed for at least one day or they 


















Age 38.9 38.9 39.5 0.6
Tenure with Current Employer 5.7 5.7 5.6 -0.1
Education years 10.5 10.5 10.3 -0.2
Total yearly earnings 30295 30320 28084 -2236
Total yearly earnings excluding zeros 30295 30321 28084 -2237
Wages (June 30th) 84 84 78 -6
Number of days working fulltime 363 363 361 -2
Number of days receiving UE Benefits 0.4 0.4 1.3 0.9
Probability of working fulltime 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
1982
Age 39.9 39.9 40.7 0.8
Tenure with Current Employer 6.7 6.7 5.2 -1.5
Education years 10.5 10.5 10.3 -0.2
Total yearly earnings 29581 29664 22304 -7360
Total yearly earnings excluding zeros 29608 29690 22429 -7261
Wages (June 30th) 83 83 75 -8
Number of days working fulltime 357 358 296 -62
Number of days receiving UE Benefits 5 4 93 88.8
Probability of working fulltime 0.99 1.00 0.85 -0.2
1983
Age 40.9 40.9 41.6 0.8
Tenure with Current Employer 7.3 7.6 0.5 -7.1
Education years 10.5 10.5 10.3 -0.2
Total yearly earnings 29214 29325 18964 -10360
Total yearly earnings excluding zeros 29496 29562 22325 -7237
Wages (June 30th) 83 83 74 -9
Number of days working fulltime 351 352 253 -98
Number of days receiving UE Benefits 8 7 72 64.8
Probability of working fulltime 0.98 0.98 0.76 -0.2
1990
Age 47.3 47.3 47.9 0.6
Tenure with Current Employer 11.6 11.9 4.6 -7.3
Education years 10.6 10.6 10.4 -0.2
Total yearly earnings 34502 34550 29914 -4636
Total yearly earnings excluding zeros 35596 35639 31434 -4205
Wages (June 30th) 99 99 88 -11
Number of days working fulltime 350 350 341 -10
Number of days receiving UE Benefits 13 13 19 6.4
Probability of working fulltime 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.0
NumberofSpells 1016598 1005093 11505
Table 1: Average Characteristics in High Attachment Workers by Mobility Status in 1982
Notes: The table shows characteristics of male workers, age 25 to 52, who were working at an 
establishment with at least 100 employees and had been working for this establishment for at least 5 
years in 1982. The first Panel shows characteristics for these worker in 1981 (the year before some 
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(a) Fraction of Large Establishments with Mass Layoffs or Plant Closings per Year










Job Separation Rates by Year






(b) Job Separations by Tenure and Year
Figure 1: The Incidence of Separations, Mass-Layoffs and Plant Closings over Time
Notes: The top figure shows the fraction of establishments with more than 100 employees that close down or have a
mass layoff in each year. Plant Closing (Mass-Layoff) is defined as a drop in employment from the previous year of at
least 80 (30) percent and of the leaving workers, less than 20 percent are employed at a common employer at their next
job. Data source is the Establishment History Panel (BHP) merged with information on all between-establishment
worker flows. For comparison the figure also displays the change in the unemployment rate. The bottom figure shows














1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Permanent Seperation No Separation
Number Displaced: 11505, Number Non−Displaced: 1005093
Event 3, Year 1982, Bal 0, Min Tenure 5,25<=Age<=52
 8 Nov 2009 at 02:06:05
Total yearly earnings (Event3) in 1982
Figure 2: Total Yearly Earnings of Displaced and Non−Displaced Workers
Notes: The figure shows total earnings in Euro (in 2000 prices) by year for workers who were employed at an
establishment with at least 100 employees in 1982 and who had been employed at this establishment for at least 5
years. The top line shows total earnings for workers who were continued to be employed at the same establishment
in 1983, while the bottom line shows total earnings for workers who permanently separated from their job in 1982








1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Permanent Seperation No Separation
Number Displaced: 11505, Number Non−Displaced: 1005093
Event 3, Year 1982, Bal 0, Min Tenure 5,25<=Age<=52
 8 Nov 2009 at 01:52:33
Sum of wages on June 30th of year (Event3) in 1982









1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Permanent Seperation No Separation
Number Displaced: 11505, Number Non−Displaced: 1005093
Event 3, Year 1982, Bal 0, Min Tenure 5,25<=Age<=52
 8 Nov 2009 at 01:26:07
Days per year working fulltime (Event3) in 1982
(b) Days employ d full-time
Figure 3: Wage and Employment of Displaced and Non−Displaced Workers
Notes: For the sample description see Figure 2. The top figures shows the daily wage in Euro for workers who were
displaced during a mass layoff in 1982 and the control group. The bottom figure shows the number of days employed








1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Permanent Seperation No Separation
Number Displaced: 11505, Number Non−Displaced: 1005093
Event 3, Year 1982, Bal 0, Min Tenure 5,25<=Age<=52
 8 Nov 2009 at 01:39:24
Days per year receiving UE Benefits (Event3) in 1982










1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Permanent Seperation No Separation
Number Displaced: 11505, Number Non−Displaced: 1005093
Event 3, Year 1982, Bal 0, Min Tenure 5,25<=Age<=52
 8 Nov 2009 at 03:00:22
Total yearly UE Benefits (ALG /ALH) (Event3) in 1982
(b) Total Amount of Unemployment Insurance Benefits in Euro
Figure 4: Unemployment of Displaced and Non−Displaced Workers
Notes: For the sample description see Figure 2. The top figures shows the number of days of receiving unemployment
insurance benefits (ALG or ALH) for workers who were displaced during a mass layoff in 1982 and the control group.
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Years relative to Separation
Separators
Number Displaced: 11505, Number Non−Displaced: 1005093
Event 3, Year 1982, Min Tenure 5, 25<=Age<=52
 8 Nov 2009 at 04:54:33
Total yearly earnings before and after Displacement − Individual Fixed Effects
Controlling for Year Effects
Figure 5: Total Yearly Earnings of Displaced Workers relative to Non−Displaced
Notes: For the sample description see Figure 2. The figure shows total yearly earnings of displaced workers relative
to non-displaced workers after displacement. Each point is the dummy from a regression of earnings on years since
1982 interacted with a dummy for whether the person was displaced in 1982. The regression controls for year fixed
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Years relative to Separation
Separators
Number Displaced: 11505, Number Non−Displaced: 1005093
Event 3, Year 1982, Min Tenure 5, 25<=Age<=52
 8 Nov 2009 at 06:48:30
Sum of wages on June 30th of year before and after Displacement − Individual Fixed Effects
Controlling for Year Effects
Figure 6: Daily Wage of Displaced Workers relative to Non−Displaced
Notes: The Figure is generated the same way as Figure 5, but with daily wage on the left hand side and is conditional
on being employed.






Earnings Stayers Earnings Movers Income Movers Income Stayers
Figure 7: Earnings and Income (Earnings + UI Benefits) of Displaced Workers relative to Non−Displaced
Notes: For the sample description see Figure 2. The figure shows total yearly earnings and total yearly income of
displaced workers relative to non-displaced workers after displacement. Income is defined as earnings from employment
plus unemployment insurance benefits.
